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INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional convention of individual ministerial responsibility and its 
place in New Zealand Government has been questioned in recent years. In 
April 1996 it was asked "[w]hat on earth does ministerial responsibility mean 
if it does not demand the resignation of a minister when his department is 
directly implicated in the deaths of 14 people?"1 This question was referring 
to the Cave Creek tragedy, where 14 young people died due to a negligently 
built Department of Conservation viewing platform. But it is also an illustration 
of the public cynicism surrounding the convention of individual ministerial 
responsibility. 
Individual ministerial responsibility has traditionally been regarded as being 
at the heart of responsible government. Responsible government is a "system 
of government in which the executive branch is controlled by ministers who 
are members of the legislative branch, and hold office as long as the 
legislative branch permits".2 The responsibility to Parliament of ministers, as 
members of the Executive, is crucial to the effective operation of responsible 
government. 
Individual ministerial responsibility is traditionally divided into three distinct 
parts - vicarious responsibility, personal responsibility and primary 
responsibility. Vicarious responsibility is the responsibility of ministers for the 
acts or omissions of their departments. Sir lvor Jennings was describing this 
when he stated that "[e]ach minister is responsible to Parliament for the 
1 C Brett "One Year On From Cave Creek: Isn 't it time for some answers?" in North and 
South (April , 1996) 48. 
2 K J Scott The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962) 118. 
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conduct of his [or her] Department. The act of every civil servant is by 
convention regarded as the act of his [or her] minister''. 3 This is as opposed to 
personal responsibility, where a minister must take responsibility for personal 
actions that bring disrepute to the office, and primary responsibility, where a 
minister must take responsibility for unacceptable outcomes that stem from 
his or her own actions or decisions. 
Closely related to ministerial responsibility is collective responsibility. Central 
to collective responsibility is the concept of unanimity - the requirement that 
Cabinet present a united front. This can be used to defeat the requirements 
of individual ministerial responsibility.4 
This paper is concerned with vicarious individual ministerial responsibility, 
which has proved to be the most elusive of the three types of ministerial 
responsibility. 5 It is 'elusive' because there is no generally accepted 
definition. Jennings' definition has proved difficult to pin down in empirical 
terms, and as a result the convention has been interpreted in differing ways. 
One school of thought holds that vicarious responsibility requires the ultimate 
sanction of a ministerial resignation to be applied after unacceptable conduct 
from that minister's department. 6 Dicey viewed the sanction of resignation as 
3 I Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5ed, University of London Press Ltd, London, 
1959) 207-208. 
4 See text at n 40. 
5 Any reference to vicarious responsibility is referring to vicarious individual ministerial 
responsibility. 
6 S E Finer "The Individual Responsibility of Ministers" in (1956) 34 Pub Adm 377 at 379. 
Finer identifies the main proponents of this view as being : A Todd On Parliamentary 
Government in England (Volume II , Longmans Green & Co, London, 1869) 385; W Bagehot 
The English Constitution (World 's Classics edition, 1872) 285; S Low The Governance of 
England (1ed , Fisher Unwin, London, 1914) 148-149; A B Keith Constitutional Law (7ed, 
1939) 207. 
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the essential part of the doctrine.7 An equally prevalent school of thought 
argues it is unrealistic for ministers to take responsibility for the actions of 
civil servants that "they do not know about and did not authorise". 8 
This debate strikes at the heart of vicarious responsibility. Michael Pearson 
stated in 1992 that "the doctrine of ministerial responsibility seems to have 
gone the way of the dinosaur''. 9 Confusion over what the convention requires 
has led to its inconsistent application by politicians and to public cynicism 
with regard to its relevance today. 
This paper will establish that vicarious responsibility as a constitutional 
convention still has a very relevant role in New Zealand government today, 
although in a diluted form. In order to place the convention in its legal 
context, the first part of the paper will establish what is meant by a 
constitutional convention, how a convention is established, and will address 
the issue of a convention's enforceability. The second part of the paper will 
examine the convention of vicarious responsibility, discussing the 
development of the doctrine, its role in Britain and operation in New Zealand. 
New Zealand case studies will be examined and the views of ministers will be 
analysed. The third part will address whether public sector reform has 
fundamentally changed notions of accountability, and whether this has 
altered the nature of vicarious responsibility in New Zealand. The paper will 
analyse the place of vicarious responsibility in New Zealand government, 
7 C Turpin "Ministerial Responsibility: Myth or Reality" in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) The 
Changing Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) 48, 49. 
8 G Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and 
Government (2ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland , 1987) 56. 
9 M Pearson "The End of Accountability?" Management (April , 1992) 75. 
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concluding that although it still holds a very relevant place, the nature of 
modern politics means that this is a somewhat diluted form of responsibility. 
II CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
The doctrine of vicarious responsibility is founded in the conventions of the 
constitution. It is necessary to examine what constitutional conventions are, 
how they are established and enforced, and the ways in which they may be 
changed. 
Constitutional conventions are rules that exist within the particular 
environment of Parliament, and are considered to be binding by those that 
work within the Parliamentary environment. 0 Hood Phillips states that 
conventions are rules of political practice or behaviour that are "regarded as 
binding by those to whom they apply, but which are not laws as they are not 
enforced by the courts or the Houses of Parliament". 10 Although conventions 
are regarded as binding, as a result of the political environment in which they 
operate, they are not always observed.11 
In determining whether a convention exists, one identifying element emerges 
from the above quotation - a convention exists when it is regarded as 
10 O Hood Phillips and P Jackson O Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(7ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd , London, 1987) 113. This point is also made in KC Wheare 
Modern Constitutions (2ed, Oxford University Press, London, 1966) 122. 
11 G Marshall Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) 6. 
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binding.12 This view is supported by Jennings, who asserts that three 
questions must be satisfied to determine whether a convention exists - "first, 
what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe 
that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?" .13 
For a convention to arise there must be precedents established to support it, 
and good reasons for the convention to exist. Wheare also identifies these 
principles, but divides them into two different categories. He argues that 
either a convention arises over a period of time, being first persuasive and 
later becoming obligatory, or it arises when an agreement is made "among 
the people concerned to work in a particular way and to adopt a particular 
conduct".14 
Conventions are not statue or common law, therefore they cannot be 
enforced by the courts. This was set out by the Privy Council with respect to 
Rhodesia, 15 and also by the Supreme Court of Canada.16 Despite this, the 
courts will use the existence of conventions as evidence, and to provide 
guidance. This can be seen in Liversidge v Anderson where the responsibility 
of the Home Secretary to Parliament was recognised, 17 or in Carltona Ltd v 
Commissioners of Works and Others where the convention of ministerial 
12 See text above n 10. Note that a convention does not have to be treated as binding, as 
conventions are not always obeyed. 
13 Above n 3, 136. 
14 Wheare, above n 10, 122. 
15 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969) 1 AC 645, 723 - the Privy Council would not 
recognise conventional relationships as creating binding obligations. 
16 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) (1982) 125 DLR 
(3d) 1, 22 - the Supreme Court of Canada would not recognise that convention could ever 
"crystallise into law". 
17 Liversidge v Anderson [1942) AC 206, 222. 
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responsibility was acknowledged.18 In New Zealand ministerial responsibility 
to Parliament has also been affirmed in the cases Shand v Minister of 
Rai/ways19 and Parsons v Burke.20 But ultimately, despite judicial recognition, 
conventions are not legally enforceable. Rather a reliance is placed upon 
those bound by conventions to uphold them. Marshall states this point 
succinctly. "In so far as a convention defines duties or obligations they 
remain morally and politically, but not legally, binding". 21 However it would be 
wrong to suggest that conventions are unenforceable because they are non-
justiciable, or that a breach of a convention would have no consequences. 
Watson notes that the public, if they are unhappy with a minister for 
breaching a convention, can express this at election time.22 Retaliatory 
measures by the Opposition can also be used to enforce conventions. If the 
Government ignores a convention, the Opposition could retaliate by ignoring 
a different convention. Watson cites the convention of pairing as an example, 
as the Government relies upon the Opposition obeying that convention , so 
that all members of Parliament do not have to be in the House of 
Representatives all the time. 23 
It has already been stated that conventions, although regarded as binding, 
are not always obeyed. Marshall states that "widespread breach of political 
18 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works and Others [1943) 2 All ER 560, 563. 19 Shand v Minister of Railways [1970] NZLR 615, 634. 
20 Parsons v Burke [1971] NZLR 244, 248. 
21 Above n 11 , 17. 
22 G Watson "Ministerial Responsibility and the Maniototo Irrigation Scheme" 6 OLR 161 , 
162. 
23 Above n 22. Pairing occurs when the Opposition removes one member from Parliament in 
a vote for every member of the Government that must be absent. This is vital so that the 
governing majority is not altered . 
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(as of linguistic) convention may itself sometimes lead to a change of 
convention". 24 This paper asserts that this is not a definitive statement. 
Constitutional conventions are often vague in terms of their content and 
application. Constant breach may bring about the change of one convention, 
but not another. Joseph stated that all conventions "are binding but some are 
'more binding' than others". 25 Breach of a convention may, but will not 
automatically lead to its change. 
Ill VICARIOUS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The crux of vicarious responsibility is seen by the public and portrayed in the 
media in terms of sacrificial resignation. This paper will establish that 
resignation is not part of the convention in New Zealand. Resignation is not a 
suitable response to matters of vicarious responsibility, but rather a response 
to serious matters of primary responsibility. 
Vicarious responsibility was established as a convention in Britain. When 
New Zealand was settled by Britain, the settlers brought with them such 
British statute and law that applied to the new colony. 26 As such, vicarious 
responsibility became one of New Zealand's constitutional conventions. This 
section will set out vicarious responsibility in its historical context and will 
24 Above n 11 . 
25 Phillip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book 
Company Ltd , Sydney, 1993) 242. 
26 The English Laws Act 1858, s1 . 
I 
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illustrate the way that it has applied in Britain, to establish a setting for its 
application in New Zealand. Case studies of its application in New Zealand 
will also be discussed. 
A The Historical Context 
Vicarious responsibility is regarded as a key part of responsible government. 
It is therefore important to identify the specific need that the convention 
developed to address. This section of the paper will identify its place as a 
constitutional convention and trace its development as a convention in 
Britain. 
It is undisputed that ministerial responsibility is regarded as a constitutional 
convention. Dicey identified it as such, as did Marshall , Hood Phillips and 
Joseph, among many others.27 The concept of ministerial responsibility arises 
from the fact that ministers derive their authority from, and act on behalf of, 
Parliament. The convention demands that they also be responsible to 
Parliament. 
In the 17th century unsuccessful attempts were made to reduce the power of 
the monarchy by making the King's Ministers responsible to Parliament. The 
purpose of such attempts was to halt financial maladministration on the part 
of the ministers.28 Gradually Parliament was able to exert more control over 
27 A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1 Oed, Macmillan and 
Company Ltd, London, 1960) 325; Marshall, above n 11, 54; 0 Hood Phillips, above n 10, 
311; Joseph, above n 25, 251. 
28 CB Anderson "Ministerial Responsibility in the 1620s" [1962} 34 Journal of Modern History 
381. 
I 
11 
ministers, and from the reign of George I "[m]inisters accepted individual 
responsibility to both the King and Parliament for the conduct of their 
departments".29 The doctrine developed further in the 19th century. Todd 
noted in 1892 that the "individual responsibility of ministers was considered to 
extend to all official acts and to relieve subordinates of public blame for their 
errors" .30 The House of Commons facilitated the development of the doctrine 
in order to provide a check upon the powers of the monarchy, and to 
recognise the ministers' responsibility to the House of Commons from whom 
they derived their support.31 
Historically associated with the convention is the principle of public servant 
anonymity and non-accountability. This means that ministers obtain credit for 
the success of the work of public servants, and take the responsibility when 
errors are made. The minister, not the public servant, is the public face of the 
government department. 
When vicarious responsibility was in its early stages a distinguishing feature 
of politics was the lack of domination by political parties. If a situation arose 
where a departmental error occurred Parliament could effectively force the 
hand of the minister. Woodhouse observed that between 1855 and 1867 five 
resignations occurred - a number disproportionate to later periods, and links 
29 Above n 25, 630. 
30 A Todd Parliamentary Government in England (Vol 2, New ed , 1892) 116-119, cited in 
Turpin , above n 7, 49. 
31 P W Wood Ministerial Responsibility: A reassessment including a consideration of the 
Labour Government's reforms (LLBHons Research Paper, University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, 1988) 3; D Woodhouse Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and 
Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) 7-8. 
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this to the uncertain majorities in the House of Commons. 32 If Parliament no 
longer had confidence in the minister, the minister had no choice but to 
resign . 
B The Status of the Convention in Britain Today 
The application of the convention has by no means been consistent. Much of 
the confusion that exists over the status of vicarious responsibility in New 
Zealand also exists in Britain. This question has been addressed in Britain by 
a number of scholars, and the general conclusion is that British ministers do 
not tend to resign for vicarious responsibility unless there are weighty political 
reasons for doing so. 33 
The development of the political party is chiefly responsible for the lack of 
ministerial resignations in cases of vicarious responsibility. The Government 
will normally hold the majority of seats in Parliament. A key feature of the 
political party is that members are 'encouraged' by the party whips to 'toe the 
party line'. If the party decides that it is not expedient to invoke the punitive 
element of the convention, then it is not possible for Parliament to force the 
resignation of the Minister. Although 'responsibility' to Parliament is expected 
and generally observed, the punitive aspect of the doctrine has become less 
important. 
32 Woodhouse, above n 31, p 9. 
33 See Finer above n 6; D Butler "Ministerial Responsibility in Australia and Britain" (1973) 26 
Parl Aff 403, 404; Turpin above n 7, 68; Woodhouse above n 31 , 35. 
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The latter half of the nineteenth century has been portrayed as the 'high 
point' of vicarious responsibility, due the number of resignations.34 This claim 
is unfounded, as only the resignation of Robert Lowe, the Vice-President of 
the Committee of the Council on Education, can truly be attributed to 
vicarious responsibility. 
In 1864 Lowe resigned after unfounded allegations were made against him 
with respect to illegally altering school inspection reports. It was later found 
that his department was responsible for the censoring against specific 
instructions from Lowe to the contrary. Lowe resigned "alleging that his 
honour had been impugned", although the House of Commons was later told 
that Lowe's resignation was unnecessary.35 Finer documents a further eight 
ministerial resignations for vicarious reasons between 1905 and 1954, but in 
only three examples was it clear that the minister resigned for an error that 
was no fault of his own.36 
The resignation of Sir Thomas Dugdale, the Minister of Agriculture in 1954, 
was claimed to be an exercise of vicarious responsibility.37 Yet although there 
were errors on the part of the department, it was the personal fault of 
Dugdale in exercising misjudgment and failing to efficiently organise his 
department that led to his resignation .38 
34 Wood, above n 31 , 3; Scott, above n 2, 129. 
35 Above n 6, 381 . 
36 Above n 6, 385. The ministers were Austen Chamberlain and Neville Chamberlain in 1917, 
and Viscount Swinton in 1938. 
37 Above n 6, 377, quoting The Economist 24 July 1954 263 (UK) ; D N Chester "The Crichel 
Down Case" in G Marshall Ministerial Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989) 
106, 111 . 
38 Marshall , above n 11 , 65; Scott, above n 2, 130. 
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These cases raise doubt as to whether resignation is part of the convention. 
Rather than a requirement of vicarious responsibility, most resignations 
occurred due to personal fault. Finer states that even these instances of 
resignation are only a "tiny number compared with the known instances of 
mismanagement and blunderings", where ministers accepted no punitive 
sanctions.39 Instead, erring ministers have been protected by the cloak of 
collective responsibility and appeals to party solidarity, symbolic cabinet 
reshuffles, or the minister has clung to office through sheer personal 
tenacity.40 In many cases an explanation is given to Parliament and 
amendatory action is taken. Resignations cannot establish a precedent when 
they constitute the exception rather than the rule. 
An alternative approach to the convention has been identified in Britain. 
Rather than invoking only one sanction, the convention has developed so 
that it operates on a number of levels, depending upon the degree of 
responsibility required. Woodhouse has identified these as redirectory 
responsibility, reporting or informatory responsibility, explanatory 
responsibility, amendatory responsibility and finally sacrificial responsibility.41 
In a situation where a minister has only indirect responsibility, for example a 
nationalised industry, it is sufficient for the minister to redirect questions 
appropriately. If required, this can be extended to informatory responsibility 
where the minister must report to Parliament. When a minister's own 
39 Above n 6, 386. 
40 Above n 6, 386-390. 
41 Above n 31, 28-33. 
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department is involved, that minister is required to fulfil explanatory 
responsibility - to explain the department's actions to Parliament. Amendatory 
responsibility then requires the minister apologise to Parliament for the 
actions of the department, and if necessary to announce that corrective 
action is being taken. Woodhouse argues that sacrificial responsibility no 
longer applies in cases of vicarious responsibility, and the only case in which 
a minister should resign would involve 'personal fault' or 'private indiscretion', 
or departmental fault which the minister "was involved or of which he [or she] 
knew, or should have known". 42 However, despite the existence of different 
levels of responsibility, where the political fallout of collectively defending a 
minister is too great it may be expedient for the minister to resign. 
There are alternatives to this view. Martin argues that ministers have 
resigned when there have been systemic failures within their departments, 
and cites the resignation of Lord Carrington as an example. Carrington 
resigned due to flaws in the intelligence service at the start of the Falklands 
War.43 However this can still be interpreted as an acceptance of personal 
fault in recognition of negligence in organising his department, and does not 
indicate the acceptance of resignation as part of the convention. 44 
The prevalent view in Britain is that many examinations of the convention 
focus upon 'resignation' as the issue at stake, rather than 'responsibility'. As 
42 Above n 31 , 38. 
43 See J Martin "A Question of Responsibility" The Dominion, Wellington , New Zealand, 28 
November, 1995, page reference unknown. 
44 G Marshall "Individual Responsibility: Some Post-War Examples" in G Marshall Ministerial 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989) 130. 
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Woodhouse has demonstrated, resignations will rarely be appropriate in 
cases of vicarious responsibility, and there are different levels of 
responsibility that can be invoked.45 G W Jones identifies resignation as a 
totally different issue to that of accountability.46 It has been established that 
the convention provides a tier of methods to demonstrate responsibility, and 
does not require sacrificial resignations - they alone do not constitute 
'responsibility'. 
C The Operation of the Convention in New Zealand 
When New Zealand became a colony of Britain, the common law and 
constitutional conventions of Britain became those of New Zealand. 47 This 
part of the paper will first outline the various ways that the convention has 
historically operated in New Zealand, by examining various cases. It will then 
look to the ways that government itself has attempted to define ministerial 
responsibility and ask whether the practice of ministers fits with such 
definitions. 
The first approach taken to vicarious responsibility in New Zealand was that 
of the Minister of Works, Robert Semple, during the debate over the Fordell 
and Turakina tunnels in 1944. After a Commission of Inquiry found that 
general laxity in the organisation of the department led to insufficient 
45 Above n 31 , 38. 
46 G W Jones "Symposium on Ministerial Responsibility: An Answer: Stand up for ministerial 
responsibility" (1987) 65 Pub Adm 87. 
47 Above n 26. 
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preparation, faulty designing and inadequate supervision, Semple stated 
that: 48 
I am not running away from ... respons;bility; but there is a great difference between 
responsibility and blame. How can one blame a man for the conduct of thousands of 
workers under his control? 
A second approach to the doctrine was taken in 1954 when a prisoner 
serving a life sentence for murder and rape escaped from Mount Eden prison 
whilst on an excursion to play bowls. The Minister of Justice acknowledged 
the lack of adequate directions for the inclusion of such prisoners in these 
excursions and discharged his responsibility by giving an account of the 
situation to Parliament and taking precautionary actions to make sure that 
such an incident would never happen again.49 
A third approach to the convention has been for the minister to completely 
deny any form of responsibility. In 1980 when there were massive cost 
overruns to the Maniototo Irrigation Scheme, the Minister of Works and 
Development, Anthony Friedlander, refused to accept responsibility and 
declined to resign . Friedlander's refusal to accept responsibility does not 
strengthen the convention, but nor does it undermine the convention. As 
noted earlier, breach of a convention does not necessarily lead to its 
change. 50 What Friedlander's refusal to accept responsibility does highlight 
are the definitional problems surrounding the convention. These will be 
discussed later in the paper. 
48 (1944) 267 NZPD 43. 
49 See Scott, above n 2, 126 and E Mcleay The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand 
~xford University Press, Auckland, 1995) 195 for accounts of this event. 
See text at n 25. 
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These three approaches to the doctrine laid the bases for the current 
approach to the convention. The following is a brief and incomplete summary 
of incidences involving vicarious responsibility, and the approach taken by 
the minister involved. 
In 1969 following an accusation of using the Tourist and Publicity Department 
for party political propaganda, the minister in charge, L A Adams, laid the 
blame on to a 'private citizen' working for the department and accepted no 
responsibility. 
In 1986 copies of the budget were distributed before being formally 
announced. The Minister of Finance Roger Douglas immediately offered his 
resignation, accepting responsibility, but the Prime Minister David Lange 
refused to accept it, stating that the "breach was not.. .your act. You did not 
know of it in advance. You could not reasonably have been expected to know 
of it". 51 Douglas had taken all steps to find out what had happened, and was 
prepared to ensure that such a mistake would not recur. The Prime Minister 
believed that Douglas was not personally to blame and therefore a 
resignation was unnecessary. 
In 1987 the Department of Maori Affairs made unauthorised arrangements to 
borrow a large sum of money without going through the appropriate channels. 
The minister, Karo Wetere, tendered his resignation but this was not 
accepted as he was protected by the shroud of collective responsibility, and 
departmental officials were blamed. 
51 Letter, Hon D Lange to Hon R Prebble (12 August 1986) cited in Palmer, above n 8, 52. 
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The 'responsible but not to blame' approach to the convention was taken one 
step further in 1992 by the Minister of Health Simon Upton when it was 
revealed that bad advice from his department led to haemophiliacs being 
supplied with contaminated blood after screening procedures had been put in 
place. Upton claimed that he was neither responsible nor to blame. 
The most recent example of the approach taken to vicarious responsibility is 
the Cave Creek tragedy, the facts of which were outlined at the beginning of 
this paper. The Commission of Inquiry found that a secondary cause of the 
collapse of the viewing platform was that management structures within the 
West Coast conservancy were lacking, and that this led to the primary cause 
of the collapse - that the platform was not constructed in accordance with 
sound building practice. When the Commission of Inquiry's report was 
released, the Minister of Conservation Dennis Marshall addressed 
Parliament. Marshall acknowledged his responsibility for the Department of 
Conservation, but stated that blame can only be attached to a minister when 
they could have prevented an error made by the department or should have 
known of the possibility that an error may occur. Marshall accepted 
responsibility, but not blame. In that context he claimed that to resign from his 
position as Minister of Conservation would be to take the easy path and that 
it would not solve any of the problems that caused the error to occur: 52 
My resignation would .... not remedy the systemic problems that contributed to this 
accident. It would be a way of emphasising the fact that I am profoundly sorry. But for 
all the symbolic power of a resignation , I do not intend to proceed from sorrow to 
abdication. 
52 (1995) 551 NZPD 10028. 
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Over the next twelve months all similar structures in the Department of 
Conservation were examined and those that were sub-standard were 
repaired or closed. Marshall also worked towards gaining a substantial 
increase in funding for the Department. On 30 May 1996 he resigned from 
the portfolio of Conservation stating that since the Commission of Inquiry's 
report he had done "everything possible to deliver on the changes needed to 
make outdoor recreation in New Zealand as safe as possible". 53 Marshall 's 
resignation was not a direct response to the requirements of vicarious 
responsibility, but due to his personal sorrow about the tragedy. This is 
illustrated in the statement that he made to the House of Representatives 
upon announcing his resignation:54 
Today I am taking a further step to express my sorrow for what happened that fateful 
day at Cave Creek. This is a personal decision, which I feel is the correct course of 
action for me now. 
Marshall approached the convention in a similar way to that of Semple. He 
accepted full responsibility but denied that blame could be attributed to a 
minister for acts he could not be expected to know about. He also believed 
that the convention demanded that responsibility be accepted and that steps 
should be taken to make sure such errors did not occur again. 
This summary illustrates the way in which the convention has operated recent 
years. Vicarious responsibility has not always been adhered to - the 
Friedlander and Upton cases illustrate this. But this does not mean that the 
53 (1996) 555 NZPD 12921 . 
54 (1996) 555 NZPD 12922. 
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doctrine no longer exists, nor that it is no longer relevant. There have also 
been cases in which ministers have accepted and satisfied the explanatory 
and amendatory components of the convention. Because the convention is 
still followed , it should not be considered irrelevant. The correct interpretation 
of the convention was exemplified by the approach that Marshall took to his 
responsibility for the errors that caused the accident at Cave Creek. What 
Semple began when he stated "I am responsible but not to blame", has 
transformed into a convention which requires the minister to accept 
'responsibility', and then work to remove the factors that allowed the error to 
occur. Such an approach is consistent with the way in which the convention 
has developed in Britain. 
Documents produced by the Government imply that this is the approach that 
should be taken by ministers when they are faced with vicarious 
responsibility. The State Services Commission's draft guidance paper for 
senior public servants stated with regard to ministerial responsibility that: 55 
On occasion this may require a minister to account for actions of a department in 
which errors have been made even though s/he may have had no knowledge of or 
involvement in those actions. So although not directly responsible for the actions of 
their departments, Ministers must answer for them and attempt to give reassurance 
that specific departmental acts of commission or omission will not be repeated . 
It is significant that these guidance principles state only that the minister has 
to account for the actions of a department, answer for the department and 
55 State Services Commission "The Public Service and Government: Extracts from the SSCs 
project: Guidance on Principles, Conventions and Administrative Practice (Public Service 
Senior Management Conference, 9-10 September 1993) 2. 
give reassurance that the error will not be repeated. This endorses the 
current status of the convention. 
The Cabinet Office Manual also couches vicarious responsibility in terms of 
'accounting' to Parliament. It notes that ministers do not have operational 
responsibility for their departments, but rather responsibility for the overall 
policy.56 This alludes to the divisibility of responsibility between the minister 
and the chief executive of the department. Neither the State Services 
Commission's guidance principles nor the Cabinet Office Manual have any 
reference to resignation as a part of the convention. This confirms the 
approach that has been followed in New Zealand. 
D A Political Interpretation 
The interpretation of the convention of vicarious responsibility will at times 
differ according to whether the person interpreting the doctrine is a member 
of the government or the opposition. This part of the paper will address 
varying interpretations of the doctrine and will establish that in some cases 
interpretations are politically motivated. 
In 1984 with reference to the cost overruns of the Maniototo irrigation 
scheme, Geoffrey Palmer (then the deputy leader of the Opposition) stated 
clearly that ministerial responsibility meant that ministers were ultimately 
responsible to the public for the actions and errors of public servants. He was 
56 Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Parliament Buildings, Wellington, 1996) 24. 
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reported in the Otago Daily Times as saying that "[w]here gross negligence 
occurs the rules of the system are that the Minister is responsible, and he 
must resign". 57 This makes no distinction between a situation when the 
minister knows of the negligence and when he or she does not. Yet three 
years later (when a minister in the Labour Government), Palmer stated that it 
was patently unrealistic for a minister to accept responsibility when a public 
servant had acted contrary to policy and instructions without the knowledge 
of the minister.58 The interpretation placed upon what the convention requires 
will often be influenced by the political status of the interpreter. It is to the 
advantage of the Opposition to place pressure upon the Government, and 
exaggerating the requirements of the convention in order to show the 
Government in a bad light is one such tool - political players will manipulate 
the convention to achieve political ends. 
In the heat of the parliamentary debate over the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Cave Creek tragedy there were many calls for the resignation of Dennis 
Marshall. These calls came from members of Opposition parties only, and 
members of the governing party defended Marshall 's stance.59 This again 
illustrates the use of the convention by Opposition parties as a political tool to 
discredit the Government. The calls for a resignation supported the 'classic' 
interpretation of the convention as asserted by Dicey. Winston Peters 
provided a strong critique of the current status of the doctrine, arguing that 
the doctrine has been trampled on in the past, and that Marshall should 
57 Otago Daily Times, Dunedin, New Zealand, 15 January 1984, page reference unknown, 
cited in Watson, above n 22, 161 . 
58 Above n 8, 47. 
59 (1995) 551 NZPD 10089. 
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resign. But he too, in the past as a minister, had agreed a ministerial 
resignation in such circumstances was unnecessary. 60 His stance had 
changed considerably from when he was a minister himself, demonstrating a 
lack of respect for, and the political nature of, the convention. 
Political parties are a dominant force in New Zealand politics, which explains 
the political operation of the convention. It is in the interests of opposition 
party members to discredit the government by asserting the classical view of 
the convention and calling for the resignation of the minister. Palmer 
acknowledges that calls for ministers to resign are usually "obscured by 
political invocations of ministerial responsibility". 61 
Much of the misunderstanding in the media and amongst the public can be 
attributed to political calls for resignation designed to discredit the 
government rather than to enforce convention. Such cynical manipulation of 
the convention highlights a lack of respect shown to it by some members of 
Parliament. But this does not detract from the role that the convention has to 
play. The next part of the paper will show that despite manipulation on the 
part of some, the convention still commands respect from many ministers. 
Ministerial responsibility is still crucial to maintaining the responsibility of 
ministers to Parliament. 
60 (1995) 551 NZPD 10035. 
61 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland , 1997) 72, 75. 
25 
E The Prevailing View of the Players 
The way in which the convention operates in reality is determined by those to 
whom it applies - ministers. It is therefore relevant to investigate the views 
held by those involved in the system, outside the heat of political debate. On 
23 April 1997, I sent a letter to all ministers and to the leaders of the 
opposition parties, requesting their views on the existence and relevance of 
the convention, and whether the state sector reforms have altered, or should 
alter the nature of the convention. I received 13 responses, by letter and 
interview.62 Seven out of the 10 responses from ministers indicated that 
vicarious responsibility requires the minister to account for errors made by his 
or her department, and to take action to ensure that such an error will not 
recur. 63 It is only in situations where policy promoted by the minister caused 
the error to occur, or the minister knew or should have known of the potential 
for the error to occur, that the minister should have to take a higher degree of 
responsibility by resigning. Such categories fit into the concept of primary 
rather than vicarious responsibility. 
This dominant viewpoint is represented by the Minister of State Services, 
Jenny Shipley. Shipley states that vicarious responsibility requires the 
62 Hons P Mccardle, S Upton , M Williamson and D McKinnon did not comment due to busy 
timetables. No response was received from Hons T Henare, L Smith, B English, J Luxton, J 
Delamere, M Bradford, B Donnelly, C Fletcher, N Smith, D Morris, N Kirton, R MacDonald 
and H Clark. 
63 Two out of the other three did not indicate their personal views. Hon P East included a 
photocopy of the relevant passage from the Cabinet Office Manual, above n 56, and Hon D 
Graham included a photocopy of an article by John Martin on the subject, rather than 
indicate their own personal views as requested . 
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minister to account to Parliament and the public through the formal 
mechanisms of Parliament such as parliamentary debates and questions, and 
the informal mechanisms provided by the media. Such accountability is in the 
form of answering to Parliament for any errors that have occurred through 
policy or the actions of their departments. Resignation should only be an 
issue in the rare case in which the minister is personally culpable. 64 Shipley's 
perspective is supported by the Minister of Education, Wyatt Creech, who 
states that "people should only be personally accountable for what they are 
personally capable of doing". 65 
Such views are not the only ones that exist with regard to how the convention 
should operate. The Minister of Housing, Murray McCully, is of the belief that 
simply answering in Parliament and 'putting things right' is not what the 
essence of the doctrine entails, and that current practice has demeaned it. 
He believes that the public and the House of Representatives require 
symbolic responsibility to be exercised.66 In contrast, the Minister of Police 
Jack Elder believes that responsibility only extends as far as "events and 
actions which the minister might reasonably have known about and had 
power to deal with". 67 This perspective is supported by Richard Prebble, the 
leader of ACT New Zealand, who holds that ministers should not be 
responsible for "actions that they neither knew about or were in any way 
64 Letter, Hon J Shipley to M Faull, 26 May 1997. These views are affirmed by the Prime 
Minister, Rt Hon J Bolger; the Deputy Prime Minister, Hon W Peters; the Minister of Finance, 
Rt Hon W Birch and the Minister of Social Welfare , Hon R Sowry. 
65 Letter, Hon W Creech to M Faull , 7 May 1997. 
66 Interview with Hon M Mccully, 13 May 1997. 
67 Letter, Hon J Elder to M Faull, 2 May 1997. 
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negligent". 68 These views represent the extremes of political opinion with 
regard to how the convention should be approached. 
In 1987 a similar survey was conducted of ministers in the fourth Labour 
Government. Seven out of the 11 comprehensive replies argued that a 
minister has to answer to Parliament for departmental errors, and must make 
sure that such errors are addressed and do not recur. 69 Again , resignation 
would only be expected if the error was the personal fault of the minister. The 
then Prime Minister David Lange made this point very clearly, stating that:7° 
Where an action had been taken by an official of which the minister had no prior 
knowledge and the conduct of the official was reprehensible , there is no obligation to 
endorse what he believed was wrong or to defend what was clearly an error of his [or 
her] department. However, the minister must remain constantly responsible to 
Parliament for the fact that something had gone wrong. 
The prevailing view of the players involved in interpreting the convention of 
vicarious responsibil ity supports the approach adopted by Marshall following 
the Cave Creek tragedy. The expression of ministers past and present is that 
the minister should only be held to 'blame' for his or her own acts or policy. In 
respect to the acts of public servants the minister should provide an account 
to Parliament and the public and work to ensure such errors do not recur. 
Such an interpretation still fulfils the requirement of responsibility to 
Parliament, without placing unrealistic expectations on ministers. 
68 Letter, Hon R Prebble to M Faull , 6 May 1997. 
69 Wood, above n 31 , 58-76. Only one minister disagreed with this interpretation of the 
convention , and the other three did not specifically address this issue. 
70 Letter, Hon D Lange to P Wood, 29 April 1987, cited in Wood, above n 31 , 68. 
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IV THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY 
The relationship between the public service and ministers is integral to the 
notion of vicarious responsibility. The traditional corollary to vicarious 
responsibility was the principle of public servant anonymity, meaning that 
ministers could take credit, but also the responsibility for the actions of public 
servants. The principle of public service anonymity has changed in recent 
years, and this raises the issue of whether vicarious responsibility should 
change alongside. This will be first addressed in relation to the changing 
accountability mechanisms for officials and secondly in relation to public 
sector reforms and the respective accountabilities of chief executives and 
ministers. 
A The Accountability of Officials 
Public servants are frequently called to provide information and to give 
advice to select committees. They are directed to answer questions on issues 
of concern and to explain departmental actions. Such accountability 
mechanisms would prima facie suggest that public servants, rather than 
ministers, are being made accountable to select committees for departmental 
actions and the delivery of advice. But public service guidelines are clear that 
when a public servant appears before a select committee it is on behalf of the 
minister. If the questions are with regard to policy or politics the official may 
refer the question to the minister. The minister may direct an official not to 
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answer certain questions or address certain issues, or to answer questions in 
a specific way.71 Ultimately the appearance of individual public servants 
before select committees is under the control of the minister and does not 
have any direct implications upon vicarious responsibility. 
B The Public Sector Reforms and Vicarious Responsibility 
In 1988 significant reform was carried out upon the public service in an 
attempt to reduce bureaucracy, promote efficiency and to clarify lines of 
accountability. The very nature of the public service was altered. As the 
relationship between ministers and their officials is central to the convention it 
is necessary to address whether this reform has altered the operation of 
vicarious responsibility in New Zealand. 
The actual reforms will be examined, and then the impact of these reforms 
upon vicarious responsibility will be analysed. The conclusion will be drawn 
that the reforms have merely reinforced an existing distinction that operated 
within the convention. 
1 The reforms 
The fourth Labour Government introduced two major reforms that were 
designed to alter the nature of the public service. These were the State 
Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989. The State Sector Act 
71 State Services Commission "The Public Service and Parliament" in Public Service 
Principles, Conventions and Practice (State Services Commission, Wellington, 1995) 5. 
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defined relationships vertically from the minister to the chief executive and 
downwards, and identifies the role of each part of the public service. The 
Public Finance Act 1989 specifies that the minister of a department is to 
identify the outcomes that he or she requires the department to produce 
through their outputs. Outputs are the products or services that a department 
provides whereas outcomes are the impacts that those products and services 
have on the general community. Outcomes are identified as the overall policy 
that the minister wishes to implement. A performance agreement is drawn up 
between the minister and the chief executive and the chief executive is 
responsible for the delivery of outputs to achieve the required outcomes. 
2 The impact on vicarious responsibility 
The principle of public service anonymity was being eroded in New Zealand 
long before public sector reform occurred. Staff at the scene of the Maniototo 
Affair were blamed for overspending and an inadequate performance. 
72 The 
same approach was taken by Simon Upton in 1992, after public sector 
reform, when he focused attention on the conduct of his department and 
advisory committees. 73 
The State Sector Act further supports such divisibility of responsibility, 
although it leaves ultimate political responsibility with the minister. This can 
72 Above n 22, 159. 
73 J Martin "The Role of the State in Administration" in A Sharp (ed) Leap Into The Dark: The 
Changing Role of the State in New Zealand since 1984 (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland , 1994) 41 , 50. 
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be seen in s 32 of the Act, which states that the "chief executive of a 
department shall be responsible to the appropriate Minister'' .74 This infers that 
the chief executive has responsibility for the operational activities of the 
department. This interpretation is supported by the references to ministerial 
responsibility in the Cabinet Office Manual. It was noted above that the 
Cabinet Office Manual advocates the divisibility of responsibility. 75 
In practice this division is difficult to apply. This can be seen in an analysis of 
vicarious responsibility after the Cave Creek tragedy. There were calls for the 
resignations of both the minister and the chief executive. Whether the failure 
was one of policy, for which the minister would be responsible, or a direct 
failure to deliver an output, for which the chief executive would be 
responsible under the State Sector Act is unclear, and public opinion on the 
issue was diverse. This lack of clarity is highlighted by Wyatt Creech, who 
argues that it is up to the individual minister to determine whether a 
departmental error was brought about due to a failure of policy. 76 This is 
problematic as it calls for a subjective assessment of the situation by the 
minister whose career may be at stake. As was seen in the aftermath of the 
Cave Creek tragedy, perceptions will differ as to whether the failure was one 
of policy or not, and unless clearly at fault, the minister is unlikely to find that 
an error is due to policy. 
74 Emphasis added. 
75 Above n 56. 
76 Above n 65. 
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By advocating the divisibility of responsibility between the relevant minister 
and chief executive, the public sector reforms create another issue which 
impacts upon vicarious responsibility. It allows for a scenario where the chief 
executive, being responsible for operational activities, is considered to hold 
full responsibility and is therefore encouraged to resign. This scenario was 
almost realised in the aftermath of the Cave Creek tragedy. Richard Prebble 
stated with regard to the Cave Creek tragedy that Bill Mansfield, the Chief 
Executive, should have resigned as he had failed to provide safe systems 
within the Department of Conservation. 77 Mansfield chose not to resign after a 
series of inquiries purportedly cleared him of responsibility, but it is arguable 
whether the Commission of Inquiry actually cleared him. It found 'systemic 
failure' within the Department of Conservation, but the State Services 
Commission found the system 'inadequate', thus removing blame from 
Mansfield. As noted above with respect to ministers, there are difficulties and 
diversities of opinion when attempting to locate responsibility. 
In an attempt to clarify when a chief executive would be expected to resign, 
the State Services Commission produced a report on the standards expected 
of chief executives in terms of accountability and responsibility.78 It outlines 
the circumstances in which a chief executive would be required to resign, and 
of particular note states that in some circumstances even though a chief 
executive may not be at fault, "the events that have taken place and the 
public perception of them, will preclude or seriously impede the chief 
77 Above n 68. 
78 State Services Commission Responsibility & Accountability: Standards Expected of Public 
Service Chief Executives - Key Documents (State Services Commission, June 1997). 
I 
33 
executive from continuing in office". 79 It is stressed that such a conclusion 
would be reached by the chief executive independently. By making such a 
statement, the divisions in responsibility requirements between the minister 
and chief executive are clear. The principle of public service anonymity is no 
longer fundamental to the concept of vicarious responsibility, and the chief 
executive is fully accountable to the public. This supports the argument that 
the convention no longer requires the minister to accept blame for the errors 
of public servants. Chief executives have now been identified as having a 
clear role in the accountability and responsibility process. 
Ultimately the reforms have divided direct responsibility for the errors of 
government departments. The minister is still responsible to Parliament in the 
explanatory and amendatory sense for any departmental errors, but is not 
expected to be sanctioned for errors that he or she knew nothing about. 
Although this is undoubtedly an improvement as it clarifies the location of 
responsibility and blame, there are still definitional problems. In borderline 
cases it will be the minister who personally decides whether the error was 
one of policy which would demand sanctions, or an operational error for 
which political responsibility only would be required. 
79 Above n 78, 10. 
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V ANALYSIS 
This part of the paper will draw together all the main issues that have been 
addressed. It will then assess the changes that have occurred to vicarious 
responsibility and identify the degree to which the convention has been 
changed. 
A The Changes: A Summary 
Vicarious responsibility was a product of an unusual era in British politics, 
and the political behaviour in that era is unlikely to recur. The lack of political 
parties meant that ministers could be held directly responsible to Parliament 
for the conduct of their departments, and forced to resign if the circumstances 
warranted. 
The development of political parties placed constraints upon the exercise of 
such direct responsibility to Parliament. Owing to the firm control exercised 
over parties it is no longer possible for a minister to be forced to resign 
unless members of the governing party also lose confidence. As noted above 
when examining the nature of constitutional conventions, it is possible for a 
convention to be altered through a widespread change of practice. Owing to 
such changing parliamentary circumstances the concept of vicarious 
responsibility has been fundamentally altered. Ministers are no longer 
responsible for the errors of their department in the 'resigning' sense. What 
the convention does mean is that ministers are required to account to 
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Parliament for what has gone wrong and to show that efforts are being made 
to put the error right and to make sure it is not repeated. Ministers should 
only be subject to such 'direct' responsibility if the error was a personal one, 
or the minister should have known that the error could take place. A minister 
should only resign in cases of primary, not vicarious, responsibility. Public 
sector reform in New Zealand has confirmed these changes, by allocating 
direct responsibility to the minister for policy outcomes, and making the chief 
executive responsible to the minister for the delivery of outputs. 
This is not a 'new' convention of vicarious ministerial responsibility, but an 
evolution. The convention has evolved as a result of the practices of 
parliamentarians, and through the changes in the political environment, to 
meet the requirements of contemporary society. 
B Assessment of the Change 
Pragmatically, the domination of the political system by political parties 
means that it is unlikely that the sacrificial component of vicarious 
responsibility will ever be exercised. Theoretically it may be possible in an 
MMP coalition government where no party is dominant, but the likelihood of 
coalition members jeopardising their hold on government is slim, unless the 
negative implications of protecting a minister are judged too great. The 
changes that have taken place in the doctrine will be assessed in terms of the 
what the convention should be addressing, and whether the amended nature 
of vicarious responsibility still achieves this. 
36 
The original reason ministers were made responsible to Parliament was to 
provide a check upon the exercise of unfettered power. Parliament is the 
elected representative of the people and Parliament's role is to ensure that 
the Executive is achieving the right results. If the Executive is not achieving 
the results required, Parliament must demand accountability. When the 
convention was established an effective (but not necessarily commonly 
practised) way of forcing ministers to be accountable was to force a 
resignation. Today, the power of Parliament and the media to demand an 
explanation from a minister, and to demand that action be taken, means that 
explanatory and amendatory responsibility is the most effective manifestation 
of vicarious responsibility. The sanction of resignation only has symbolic 
value - Marshall believes that the Conservation Department would not have 
received increased funding had he not stayed and fought for it. 
80 The division 
of accountability between the minister and the chief executive means that 
those who are directly responsible are held accountable, and the minister 
should accept explanatory and amendatory responsibility to Parliament. The 
purpose of vicarious responsibility is exercised far more effectively in this 
manner. 
Distinguishing between instances of vicarious and primary responsibility is a 
problem in this amended version of ministerial responsibility. As set out 
above, Creech has stated that it is up to the minister to decide whether a 
80 Interview with Hon D Marshall , 10 June, 1997. 
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departmental error was brought about due to a failure in policy or a failure 
that the minister could not have been aware of, and only if it is a failure in 
policy should the minister consider tendering his or her resignation . The only 
case of a minister ever having resigned due to ministerial responsibility in 
New Zealand was Apirana Ngata in the 1930s, due to a conflict between his 
personal and ministerial interests. There is no case of any minister resigning 
because of departmental errors which he or she knew nothing about. There is 
also no case of any minister resigning due to personal fault. The definitional 
problems noted above were illustrated in the Marginal Lands Board Affair of 
1980. The Minister of Lands had made a representation on behalf of the 
daughter of the Minister of Agriculture to the Marginal Lands Board. A 
Commission of Inquiry found that there was no impropriety in the acts of 
either the Minister of Lands or the Minister of Agriculture, although they had 
acted unwisely. Therefore they were not required to resign. 81 The Marginal 
Lands Board Affair illustrates the difficulty in defining the degree to which a 
minister must be personally at fault before a resignation will be required. It is 
a question of interpretation (often subjective) as to the conclusion that will be 
reached. The fact that no minister since Ngata has resigned due to ministerial 
responsibility shows that it will be a very rare circumstance for a minister to 
accept sanctions. If ministers are merely repositioning blame when they are 
the ones that should be accepting blame, then the purpose of the convention 
is being defeated in New Zealand. 
81 Above n 8, 48. 
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Despite these definitional problems and the potential for political 
manipulation, the current form of vicarious responsibility still has a vital role 
to play in compelling ministers to remain responsible to Parliament for the 
activities of their departments. Although in a somewhat diluted form 
compared to the original version, it remains one of the few mechanisms that 
can be invoked to hold ministers to account. 
VI CONCLUSION 
It has been established that individual ministerial responsibility still holds a 
very relevant place in New Zealand government, but it is in a diluted form to 
that which was exercised when the convention was established. The 
convention has been altered through the widespread practices and beliefs of 
ministers. Ministers are no longer required to resign for vicarious 
responsibility, if indeed they ever were. Rather they are held politically 
responsible to Parliament by being made to account for any errors made by 
their departments, and to explain and carry out procedures to ensure such 
errors do not recur. This manifestation of vicarious responsibility is the most 
effective mechanism to ensure responsibility to Parliament. 
It remains problematic as to when a minister should resign for reasons of 
primary responsibility. An ongoing problem that needs to be resolved is the 
relative ease with which a minister can reject personal blame in favour of the 
less severe responsibilities that vicarious responsibility entails. 
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Ultimately it is for the minister to make the decision whether to accept 
personal blame or only political responsibility. If the circumstances only 
demand the exercise of political responsibility then the requirements of the 
convention are still being met. However if the circumstances demand that the 
minister accept blame as well as responsibility , and the minister ignores this, 
then the requirements are being ignored. In New Zealand the convention still 
has a significant role, but it has become easy for a minister to take only 
political responsibility and not accept personal blame. When this occurs the 
original purpose of the convention is denied. 
Despite the potential for manipulation, this essay has established that the 
current form of the convention still has a place in New Zealand Government 
as an effective tool with which to hold ministers responsible for the actions of 
their departments. 
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